Free Markets, Free People

Feminized MOH guy does part three

o, I’m not going to go into another long dissertation/Fisking.  We all know how I feel.  Instead I’ll just point out that Mr. Fischer is still trying to justify his nonsense and using every tactic known to those losing an argument in an attempt to salvage his battered ego.  My third rebuttal (and it is extremely polite if I say so myself) is comment 5 – just below Scott Jacob’s. 

If you’re unfamiliar with this little kerfuffle, start here and go here then hit the link above.



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9 Responses to Feminized MOH guy does part three

  • Maybe he just wants attention…don’t feed the trolls.

  • McQ I think you’re being a little too sensitive (and this is not the correct word) in this affair.

    It’s demonstrably true that the actions of the soldier you have listed were heroic and worthy of the MOH.
    It’s also demonstrably true that the actions of SSG Smith’s actions were the result of his unit being attacked.

    However, is it also true that no MOH’s have been awarded for similar actions occuring in essentially offensive operations:  al la LT Hawkins on Tarawa or the many MOH’s awarded to 8th AF members conducting bombing missions over Germany, just to list a quick two.

    This is not to say that MOH’s are somehow unworthy if earned repelling attacks (although occuring in another nation’s forces, at another time, the Battle of Rorke’s Drift in 1879 in which more British VCs were awared at one time/engagment in British Military History,  is one of the most celebrated in history).

    I do think, however, that one can respectfully ask , without being accused of belittling the courage, sacrifice and ‘last true measure’ of those whose actions have resulted in the bestowing of the MOH, why have no MOH’s been awarded for offensive operations?  I would be quite confident that recomendations have to have been made, but why no awards?   

    • The point, Don, is every operation in which it was awarded, excepting those who fell on a grenade, was awarded for an offensive operation. The Taliban didn’t come to SSG Miller, he went to them. Same with Smith, Monti, Murphy, etc.

      • I agree with you about that, SSG Miller made the trip.

        You know the Lytton quote, “The pen is mightier than the sword” well, Mr. Fischer, is obviously not yet fit for crayons, let alone pens.

      • I think you’re splitting hairs.  While ‘strategically’ the US was conductive offensive operations, SSG Miller was defending his unit from an ambush.  In the conduct of that defensive he took agressive action, no doubt about it.

        Where are the MOH recommendations for situation in which our troops were attacking enemy postions?  I ask again, where are the MOH recommendations for a Lt. Hawkins of Tarawa type action?  Are we to believe that no MOH type recommendations were made for situations like I’m alluding to? 

        • Did you read Robby Miller’s MOH citation, Don? Or the narrative? If you did you’d know that Miller’s ODA was on a patrol going into a targeted village and then into a known Taliban stronghold. That’s just like what Tarawa was, sir. We landed on a known Japanese stronghold and took the battle to them. They didn’t come find Hawkins, he landed and found them. The Talibs didn’t go find Miller hunkered down in some FOB – Miller and his ODA went and found them. That’s an OFFENSIVE operation in anyone’s book.

          If you can’t see that in Miller’s actions or the mission his ODA was on, I’m not sure what to say.

          And are you really trying to say this isn’t comparable to Hawkin’s citation (and this is only a part of Miller’s narrative):

          With heavy fire from insurgent forces from all sides of his position engulfing him, Staff Sgt. Miller continued to engage at least four other insurgent positions, killing or wounding at least 10 insurgents.

          The darkness of the night and limited visibility made Staff Sgt. Miller’s weapon, also the most casualty producing, the greatest threat to the insurgent ambush. The highlighted muzzle flash and the distinct sound from his SAW instantly marked Staff Sgt. Miller as an easily identifiable target.

          Cognizant that his vulnerability increased with every burst from his SAW, Staff Sgt. Miller continued to engage the enemy courageously drawing fire away from his team and onto his position. Within seconds, Staff Sgt. Miller began receiving a majority of the insurgents’ heavy volume of fire.

          Realizing that his team was pinned down and unable to actively engage the enemy, Staff Sgt. Miller, with complete disregard for his own personal safety, continued to charge forward through the open area engaging multiple elevated insurgent positions and purposely drawing fire away from his trapped ODA members.

          Staff Sgt. Miller’s cover fire was so accurate that it not only provided the necessary cover to save his team, it also suppressed the enemy to the right flank of the patrol, to the point where they could not reposition from that direction against the ODA for the duration of the engagement.

          His actions single-handedly provided the needed cover fire that allowed his fellow ODA members to maneuver to covered positions as the ANA broke formation and ran away from the kill zone.

          During his final charge forward, Staff Sgt. Miller threw two hand grenades into fighting positions, destroying the positions and killing or wounding an additional four insurgents. Only when Staff Sgt. Miller realized his fellow team members were out of immediate danger, and in positions to support him, did he attempt to move for cover.

          Miller was badly wounded earlier in the engagement and then, finally mortally wounded. When his team was finally able to get to his body he didn’t have a single round or grenade left on his body. Not one. Talk about “last full measure”.

          And then there’s this:

          Post-battle intelligence reports indicate that in excess of 140 insurgents participated in the ambush, more than 40 were killed and over 60 were wounded. Staff Sgt. Miller is credited with killing more than 16 and wounding over 30 insurgents. His valor under fire from a numerically superior force, complete selflessness and disregard for his own life, combined with his unmatched ability to accurately identify and engage insurgent positions, allowed his patrol to move to the safety of covered positions.

          So Miller is responsible personally for taking out 46 killed or wounded with his SAW and the air strikes he called in combined with his fire (and that of his ODA) ended up killing or wounding 100 out of 140 man company sized unit that then withdrew from the battlefield, but that somehow doesn’t measure up to Hawkins on Tarawa? Really?

          And finally this to think about:

          Throughout the engagement, the insurgent fire around Staff Sgt. Miller was so intense that his fellow team members could not see him due to the dust, debris, and RPG and small arms fire impacting around him. During the ensuing 25-minute battle, Staff Sgt. Miller was mortally wounded by a second gunshot to his upper torso under his left arm. Despite suffering a second and fatal wound, Staff Sgt. Miller remained steadfast and continued his selfless acts of heroism. He provided essential disposition and location reports of insurgent actions and he relentlessly fired his SAW until he expended all of his ammunition and threw his final hand grenade.

          Nope – not comparable at all, is it Don?

          To answer your question “where are the MOH recommendations for a Lt. Hawkins of Tarawa type action?”, I’ll again say, “see above”.