Watching China Posted by: McQ
on Friday, March 04, 2005
We've noted here many times that while terror and the middle east are the issues which have our attention right now, those with any understanding of geopolitics keep a wary eye on China. China may not be the bull in the crystal shop (yeah, I purposely avoided the pun) right now, but it is quietly building itself into a dominant world power.
My guess, and it is only a guess, is that China will someday announce that new status by grabbing Taiwan and daring anyone, particularly the US, to do anything about it.
One of China's problems, in that regard, has been its inability, militarily to attack Taiwan and then sustain its army. A) it doesn't have the military transport (in shipping) to land and sustain an army on Taiwan and B) it doesn't have the navy to protect those sealanes (i.e. the Taiwan straits) even if it did have the transport.
China has the air transport to accomplish an airborne invasion, but airborne troops are very light fighters and would be overwhelmed fairly quickly. What China needs, obviously, is naval shipping which can land troops and armor for that type of an operation.
Beginning in January of this year, some things were noticed which bear close watching. Reported on Jan 2:
China is converting older frigates and destroyers to APDs (fast transports). At the rate the conversions are going, China will soon have at least eight APDs. The first to be converted are the Jianghu class frigates, which were built in the 1970s and are now being retired. To create an APD, most weapons are removed from these frigates, with the now empty spaces modified to transport cargo or troops. The 1,800 ton Jianghu’s have a top speed of about 46 kilometers an hour. This enables APDs to move quickly, especially during darkness, to reach their destination. Shorter travel time makes the APDs less vulnerable to attack (and easier to defend, especially if you have to keep fighters overhead.) Taiwan is 300 kilometers from the Chinese coast. Each APD could carry several hundred troops, or a few hundred tons of cargo.
Then not long after that, on Jan 7, this report was made:
While not much is published about the actual capabilities of Chinese amphibious shipping, there is one source available; the PLA Officers Handbook. This reference, which all PLA officers have to purchase, is, of course written in Chinese. But this handbook is not classified and is sold quite openly. This is a custom the Chinese picked up from the Russians. The Handbook gives the technical details of Chinese amphibious shipping, so that officers can calculate what can be carried in each type of ship. The Chinese LSTs (landing ship, tank) can carry 2,000 tons, versus the 800 ton figure usually given by Western analysts. The Type 067 landing craft is described in rather alarming terms, if your are a Taiwanese general. The Handbook gives the Type 067 a capacity of 50 tons, a range of 800 kilometers, endurance of ten days at sea, and the ability to operate in rough water while using its own navigation system. There are actually three different Type 067s, the first version began building in the 1970s. There are about 130 of these. The second version, of which 300 are available is substantially the same. But the third version, which began building in the late 1990s, is still being built. A scaled up version of the Type 067, the Type 271, can carry the latest, heavier (50 ton) Chinese tanks. The Handbook also refers to hundreds of commercial ferries and barges that can be used for amphibious operations against Taiwan, and describes how they would be loaded with military equipment. The Handbook indicates that there is sufficient lift for 250 infantry and mechanized (tank and mechanized infantry) battalions. That’s about twenty divisions. There is additional shipping (mostly civilian) for moving support units. Note that the Handbook is not a piece of propaganda, but a practical manual describing how the Chinese would go about making war.
You get your info from whatever sources you can. So we have, to this point, the conversion of old frigates into fast transports and the second which tells us there are about 430 amphibious ships (LST) which can carry tanks.
Eleven days later, another report surfaces about China's growing amphibious capability:
China appears to be building small amphibious ships in as many as five different shipyards (Lunshan, Huangpu, Jiangnan, Shanghai and Zhonghua). These are ships that could make the run across 300 kilometers of open water, at least in good weather, carrying a tank or two, some trucks, or a company of infantry. Larger amphibious ships, like their new LSD (landing ship dock) are building at a more leisurely pace. In any event, the LSD and LST type ships are also useful for longer range amphibious operations. But the smaller craft have only one target; Taiwan. If there is no invasion attempt against Taiwan, the hundreds of new small amphibious craft can be used for river and coastal shipping operations (which carry a lot of cargo in a country that is still underserved by modern highways and railroads.) But in the meantime, this building program is sending a rather unpleasant message to Taiwan.
If I were Taiwanese, that's certainly the way I'd interpret it.
Now a new report surfaces that adds even more fuel to that fire. China is making an apparent arms deal with our best friend Russia for? High tech amphibious shipping:
China, which currently only has small hovercraft (LCAC), is buying some of the world’s largest LCACs from Russia. These are the Zubr class craft, which can carry 130 tons (three tanks, or a combination of lighter armored or non-armored vehicles). The Zubrs also carry two stabilized MLRs (multiple tube rocket launchers), four short range anti-aircraft missiles systems (Igla-1Ms) and two AK-630 six-barrel 30mm close-in weapon systems (CIWS), for defense against anti-ship missiles. The current LCACs China has were designed and built in China, but carry only about twenty soldiers and are used to quickly get troops from amphibious ships to shore. Four of them are carried on each of the larger amphibious ships. The Zubrs, with a top speed of 100 kilometers an hour, can go right from the Chinese coast to Taiwan, and land troops and armored vehicles on shore areas that would otherwise not be passable by troops coming in on standard amphibious boats. It’s not known how many Zubrs the Chinese are getting. These craft are expensive (the price and weapons configuration is negotiable, but the cost is somewhere over $10 million each) and China might only want to buy a few to get some experience, and figure out how to build their own. However, a dozen or more Zubrs would greatly complicate Taiwanese defense plans against a Chinese amphibious assault.
If you're intersted in seeing what a Zubar class landing craft looks like check it out here.
I'm not trying to be an alarmist here, and certainly if the Chinese are only getting a few Zubars to check out, it would argue against an imminent invasion of Taiwan. But to me the signs are unmistakable.
Another obvious part of any plan to invade Taiwan would be their navy, and the most important requirement for their navy is to be of the strength and capablity to hold the Taiwan Straits indefinitely in order for any invasion force to have a chance at success.
Are the Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) preparing for that? According to reports, they may very well be doing exactly that with a two phase strategic plan:
The PLAN's evolving strategy has been described in terms of two distinct phases. The strategy's first phase is for the PLAN to develop a "green water active defense strategy" capability. This "green water" generally is described as being encompassed within an arc swung from Vladivostok to the north, to the Strait of Malacca to the south, and out to the "first island chain" (Aleutians, Kuriles, Ryukyus, Taiwan, Philippines, and Greater Sunda islands) to the east. Analysts have assessed that the PLAN is likely to attain this green water capability early in the 21st century. Open-source writings also suggest that the PLAN intends to develop a capability to operate in the "second island chain" (Bonins, Guam, Marianas, and Palau islands) by the mid-21st century. In the future, the PLAN also may expand its operations to bases in Myanmar, Burma. These bases will provide the PLAN with direct access to the Strait of Malacca and the Bay of Bengal.
The reports of a desire for a first phase "green water active defense strategy" which is centered on the "first island chain" obviously encompasses Taiwan. But it is the second phase, in my estimation, where Taiwan becomes vulnerable.
The reason I say that is that once China's navy pushes past the first island chain to the second island chain, and places naval units beyond Taiwan, it has the capability to threaten US naval units and sealanes. At that point, it is in position to take on US naval taskforces which might respond to an invasion of Taiwan.
What are two things then that China will need in order to mount this threat beyond the first chain of islands?
Submarines and aircraft carriers.
But China has no aircraft carries at this time. True, but times are changing:
In recent years, open-source writings have increasingly suggested that the PLAN is interested in the acquisition of an aircraft carrier. While acquisition of an aircraft carrier would improve the PLAN's power-projection capability, liaison with senior PLAN officials has indicated that the high costs associated with acquisition and maintenance are prohibitive. That having been said, Beijing leadership views the development of a carrier capability as a key step in increasing China's maritime prestige, and it is likely to exert pressure on the PLAN to acquire an aircraft carrier. Speculation as to when the PLAN may acquire an aircraft carrier varies from as early as 2004 to as late as 2020. Clearly, costs notwithstanding, if it is to assume a greater role as a regional maritime power, the PLAN must eventually make this investment. With this in mind, there is a possibility that the PLAN will pursue a more cost effective near-term solution through the acquisition of a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) platform to support helicopter or VTOL aircraft operations.
Even if worst case China doesn't have a carrier until 2020, it would still have them on schedule for phase two of their plan.
As for submarines, the Chinese have had a number of problems to this point. But, as you'll see in this next excerpt, China plans to remedy their problems with western technology, or said another way, the west is apparently going to sell them the rope with which to hang us:
In the face of a post-Tianamen freeze on the export of U.S. weapons systems to China, the PLAN has relied heavily on the acquisition of advanced weapons and sensor systems from a number of other Western countries, including Israel and France. These acquisitions notwithstanding, the PLAN's eventual goal is to develop the indigenous capability to produce advanced naval units, weapons, and sensor systems. The lack of success of the PLAN's Ming- and Song-class diesel submarine programs, the slow progress in its development of next-generation attack and ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines, and the modest success of its newest indigenously produced Luhai-class guided-missile destroyer, suggest that China's Navy will continue to be largely dependent on Western technology well into the next decade.
Personally, and this is my opinion, I think Taiwan's days are numbered if China is successful in implementing the plan outlined here. It will be a few decades from now but it seems apparent that China has plans to take the island whether the US or the world care.
Just as obvious, unfortunately, is the fact that the west seems willing to help China in this endeavor by selling it arms and technology. A rift is developing between Europe and the US over selling arms and technology to China.
Jacques Chirac said it was "no longer justified" but Europe and the US should agree on conditions for lifting it.
Earlier, Mr Bush warned that arms transfers to Beijing would "change the balance" of China-Taiwan relations.
As noted here, Bush would appear to be entirely correct in his assessment.
Either Europe doesn't care about Taiwan or doesn't care about the possiblity of China expanding its influence in the region or both. Regardless, helping China arm seems to me to be a counter intuitive move for any country or leader which holds peace as an important goal.
Relations between Taiwan and mainland China are set to be a key issue at Beijing's annual session of parliament, which begins under tight security on Saturday.
Observers expect the National People's Congress (NPC) to approve a proposed new anti-secession law targeting Taiwan at the 10-day meeting.
Although few details of the proposal's wording are publicly known, it is believed the law will make the secession of Taiwan from China illegal.
China has considered Taiwan a renegade province since communist forces drove nationalists from the mainland in 1949, and has repeatedly threatened to use military power against the island if it declares independence.
"China's secession law is not a war mobilization act," Jiang Enzhu, a spokesman for the NPC, said Friday, according to the Reuters news agency.
Perhaps not, but it sure makes action to prevent secession much more defensible now that its "legal" to do so, doesn't it.
There’s been some great articles floating around in blogs (some in this one I believe) about the long-term strategy of drawing on Japan and their navy to be a regional counter-balance to China. That is very long-term strategy though, and to be honest, I can’t see Japan (or us) going to war if the Chinese take Taiwan.
Dare we consider the possibility of shipping Taiwan tactical nukes to act as a deterrent to invasion?
Keep in mind that China has bought ex-Soviet Kiev class aviation cruisers that are now floating casinos, and also bought the Varyag, an incomplete carrier that stalled after the collapse of the USSR. They also still have the ex-Melbourne, according to some reports, and reportadly did extensive tests on it. There were even talks in the 90s with Spanich shipbuilder Bazan about building a small CATOBAR carrier for them, but they fizzled when Bazan got concerned that the Chinese only wanted the blueprints. And with Melbourne, they have had time to study steam cats.
The best thing that could happen for Taiwan is if Hong Kong completes their capitalization of their mainland masters.
We haven’t yet quite got to a Ukraine or Lebanese type uprising. However, the anti-democratic puppet the Mainland Chinese imposed upon the Brit-trained freemen of the island nation of Hong Kong is under severe pressure to step down, early. Even if he saves face by promoting himself into a higher-level position in the Mainland government, the vacancy he leaves provides an opportunity for a more democratic leader to take over in Hong Kong. And if the citizens there are widely seen to demand such an outcome, and win, then it will be more difficult for the mainlanders to try and impose themselves upon the larger free island of Taiwan.
Meanwhile -- what sorts of things might a US aircraft carrier want to do to defend itself against Russian-made "Backfire Bombers" ? I’m thinking a bigger wing of high-altitude unmanned observation drones that could see attackers coming from far over the horizon, so to guide more deadly manned fighter jets to engage outside the bomber’s attack range ...
The "arms race" is back. Luckily this is a game the US is good at.
Let me get this straight. Chinese trade with Taiwan is at an all-time high, and Taiwan just elected a bunch of politicians that are more likely to take a go-slow approach with China in their last round of elections. Meanwhile China’s economy has been growing at breakneck speed due to the substantial reforms it’s undergone over the past 20 years, and continues to gradually become a freer country with time (because the Party is obsessed with having a strong economy, and freedom and prosperity are necissary corrolaries of one another). The earliest that China could realistically be able to pull of an invasion of Taiwan is somewhere in the vicinity of 2020. That’s 15 years from now. In that amount of time, interaction between China and the mainland is bound to increase along with economic activity and China will have moved on to its next generation of leadership, jettisonning the last of the Old Guard of the CCP into retirement. Does anybody seriously believe that 15 years from now, the relationship between China and Taiwan will the same as it is now? I don’t.
China is going to be the second-biggest player on the world stage over the next 20 years, no doubt about that. That’s why it’s important to start recognizing them as a potential strategic partner rather than as a threat. I guarentee you, ten years from now an invasion of Taiwain will look even less likely than it does now.
If China does desire to mount a military offensive, submarines are the key. Given the lack of Chinese carriers, submarines are the only threat that could keep US carrier groups out of the strait. With a credible sub force, the potential loss or one of more US carriers would probably affect our willingness to take a stand.
Of course, a noisey sub is not really a threat, and China is unlikely to have nuclear subs anytime soon, which leads some to write down this possibility. I’d point out, however, that the USSR had some diesel/electric subs that were quite stealthy. These were reasonably useless in the cold war, given their quite limited submerged range, but Taiwan isn’t that far from the mainland, and electric boats could present a threat for long enough for fast transports to cross.
It’s a scary prospect, and one that doesn’t require much in the way of technical advancement by the Chinese (especially if Russia still has some of their boats around, and needs money). This is a hard threat for us to counter - WMDs provoke public ire, but diesel subs? My hope is that our current (classified) technologies and procedures for sub detection are better than anything I know about, and this wouldn’t really be a threat.
A few thoughts: Taiwan itself, as a "rogue province", doesn’t matter crap.
What does matter is that China considered itself the center of the world and the center of civilization for 5000 years. The last 200 years hasn’t sat well. It seems to me that after thinking about it, they want to be the top dog in East Asia again.
That means gaining military and economic superiority to Japan and Korea, but also means pushing the US out.
They’ve achieved some of that; the Philippines turned to China for some economic help recently; I can’t remember the specifics, but it was something the Philippines would normally ask of us.
But China can’t really achieve any measure of supremacy with a huge, immovable land/air base sitting 150 nautical miles off of their coast.
So they’ve got to take it. Eventually.
They’ve been trying to assimilate Taiwan; Taiwan has responded by not allowing direct contact. It might not be stated clearly in the news articles, but when someone wants to fly back to China for the New Year and has to fly through Hong Kong, that’s Taiwan’s fault, not the PRC. So much for freedom.
And the last set of politician’s elected in Taiwan are ones most eager for complete independence, not reunification. China, having been patient, has been rewarded for their restraint by a govt less likely to consider peaceful reunification.
So if they decide to use the military to achieve reunification, and thus gain near-complete control of the seas adjacent to their coastline, they will have to use military force.
They don’t need to defeat the US to take Taiwan; they just need us to hesitate (out of fear of excessive casualties) long enough to present the world with a fait accompli. It would also be good if they can take Taiwan with as little death and destruction as possible...they wouldn’t want to slaughter the goose that lays the golden egg.
Nuclear submarines are not stealthy. They are noisy as crap. The advantage of nuclear power is endurance: you don’t need to surface. Diesels need oxygen in order to charge up the batteries...but on battery power, they are as silent as silk. And they have plenty to sneak up on us...maybe.
But the Sovremenny-class destroyers have the Sunburn Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles...
Defeat the US? Pshaw! Credible threat to keep us at bay? Hmmm....
My bottom line? The only reason China seems to be considering a military solution is because Taiwan has clearly been moving away from reunification. But a military battle over Taiwan is not the biggest threat to US interests here. And China could be ready to make a move within the decade...
Of course. Neither would you want to "Die for Danzig," I trust?
I have to wonder, though: Was Kosovar worth the life of a single American pilot? Or a Serbian (by dint of our actions), either?
And for places like Seoul, why would we want to commit troops to defend a bunch of people who lived in a far away country whose writings we cannot pronounce in 1950?
Perhaps Taiwan isn’t worth defending. But let’s have some reasons for that, beyond a pithy "dying for a name change."
Whether by hook or crook, China wants Taiwan under its direct control."
Apples and oranges. Hong Kong was strategically a heck of a lot easier to grab than Taiwain would be. The leadership of the party had different priorities then than it does now, and the leadership will change again by the time a Taiwan invasion becomes militarily feasible. In that amount of time, one of two things will happen: A) China will have changed enough that Taiwain is willing to agree to be nominally a part of China while retaining de facto autonomy, or B) China will have been used to the status quo for so long that they stop caring too much about Taiwan’s name change. Either outcome will be fine. But the easiest way to fuck that up and stop either one from happening would be for either side to do something idiotic and spark off a confrontation. Right now Taiwan is the more likely candidate because its leaders think they can count on US backing. That perception needs to change.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration’s attempt to block arms sales to China is both ineffective and counterproductive. There is no percievable gain to be had here for the US. Where is Bush going with this? Why is he trying to piss off the second-largest financer of US debt? There’s no rational principle guiding the US policy toward China right now, just a vague feeling that those ex-commies are getting mighty big and scary and we dun’ like it. Belligerency without any percieveable gain is the textbook definition of boneheaded diplomacy.
