[I] am one who believes strongly that our presence is now a detriment to our achieving our goals. As a consequence, I would say we need to be looking for excuses to withdraw, not for reasons to stay. That’s not cutting and running, that’s saying this is what we came for: The country has had several elections; it has a constitution, etc. We’ll stay engaged, but we’re not going to run this place. If we’re trying to get it perfect, we’re going to be there a long, long time and we’ll never, by definition, make it perfect because our presence will prevent it from being perfect. Having spent a couple years training their forces, I also believe the Iraqi security forces are far more capable than we give them credit for, especially if we don’t busy ourselves by trying to make them look like mirror images of us. ...

[Our withdrawal should] be graduated, but it’s saying we recognize that it’s your country, and we’re going to leave like we said we would and there’s no great quarrel over our intent or what we’re really going to do. Just by doing what we claimed we were going to do will build us great credibility [among Iraqis]. Going into Iraq was a bad idea, but now that we’re there we need to figure out some way to leave and sooner is better than later. I do think the training mission will need to continue, but it won’t be as robust as it is now. I think there are some combat missions we probably need to perform in the border areas and keep sufficient force in the [Gulf] region so that we can ensure the survival of this government. This is not a get-on-our-helicopter-and-leave strategy that says “you’re on your own.”

It is a fundamental mistake talking about exit strategies rather than talking about military objectives and winning the war. Winning the war does not mean you have to march into an enemy capital and overthrow the country. In that context, it seems the goals in Iraq, by which then we could withdraw our forces, are fairly straightforward. First, [there is] the creation of a representative government in Baghdad that has basically the acceptance of a majority of the people and can do the basic functions of a sovereign state. Second, you have to have security services capable of meeting those objectives like border security, crime control, counterinsurgency, and defense of the state. Third, and we’re fairly close to being there, the insurgency needs to be sufficiently crippled. An Iraq-led counterinsurgency in a year or two should be able to deal with the insurgency’s remnants. If you look at Iraq, fourteen out of eighteen provinces have less than one attack per day; the majority of the attacks are in the Baghdad area and in Sunni-dominated provinces. So it’s not a nationwide insurgency, it’s a local and regional insurgency.

In a sense, we’re probably two years behind where we ought to be, but we’re moving in the right direction in terms of Iraqi military training, with the proviso: You can’t speed it up. In fact, you might argue to slow it down. We tried to rush a police force into place and threw people into uniforms without giving them equipment or training, and they failed. You have to train each private, platoon, brigade, and battalion—you also have to train the officers and coordinate them with other units, as well as teaching air support, how to plan logistics without running out of bullets, etc. And all these things take time. In terms of an exit strategy, faster is exactly the wrong thing.

This is going to end in one of two ways: Either we manage to move toward stability, there is a progressive reduction in conflict, and we bring the Sunnis into the process, or it will end with the Shiite-run government rolling over the Sunnis and slaughtering them.

To sum it up, what started out a war of choice is arguably now a war of necessity. The costs of withdrawal are likely to be quite high, but the costs of persevering and achieving our objectives of a democratic Iraq that is not a threat to its neighbors is also quite high. We have not “fessed up” to ourselves just how difficult this situation is, that it will require, as [Defense Secretary] Donald Rumsfeld said, a “long, hard slog.” The administration hasn’t done the things that would indicate there is this high level of seriousness ... Also, it’s hard to feel this is a war waged for high stakes when the American people are not being asked to make any level of sacrifice. We haven’t seen tax increases to cover the war’s costs or even a war-bond drive.
[...]
First, put one competent person in charge of the overall effort in Iraq, including intelligence-gathering, military, diplomatic, and reconstruction efforts—and that has to be the ambassador. Second, when you find a good commander, keep him there [in Iraq]. Third, emphasize population security rather than sweep operations. I clearly believe this is a war on intelligence; that is, if we win the intelligence war, we win the war. A critical source of intelligence, particularly finding who the insurgents are, is the Iraqi people. The best way to get that information from them is to provide them with security. The U.S. military has been modifying [their sweep operations] somewhat by leaving Iraqi battalions behind [in secured areas], but it’s not clear how competent these Iraqis are. [I recommend leaving] not just an Iraqi battalion behind but one with a higher level of embedded U.S. soldiers with it.

I would avoid publicly speculating about timelines for withdrawal. That only feeds the frenzy and puts the White House into a bidding war with Democrats over who can withdraw troops faster. Any pullouts should be based on objective conditions on the ground, not on political conditions back in the United States . There is a real danger of pulling out troops too soon. Iraqi forces are getting better, as Bush says, but they still need a lot of support. ...

The point isn't to exit; it's to win. I doubt that we'll be able to pull all of our forces out of Iraq in the foreseeable future. But we'll certainly be able to reduce the number over time. The point isn't to stamp out the insurgency; that's not an achievable short-term objective. The point is to give the Iraqis enough breathing space to establish a stable democratic government. We need to be careful about how we define victory. We can still win even if the insurgency isn't finished, as long as the Iraqis are doing the bulk of the fighting.

• Train Iraqi security forces.


• Give the Iraqis time and space to establish democratic institutions.


• Reassure the US and Iraqi public about US goals, intentions and progress.


• Withdraw US troops at a slow to moderate pace.