Iraq: an Overview Posted by: Jon Henke
on Wednesday, January 04, 2006
I'm a bit late to this, but a clearer understanding of the situation in Iraq is always worthwhile. Juan Cole names the "Top Ten Myths about Iraq in 2005". I'll excerpt and paraphrase...
1. The guerrilla war is being waged only in four provinces. — ["something like 10 million of Iraq's 26 million people" live in those provinces, so this hardly means violence is limited]
2. Iraqi Sunnis voting in the December 15 election is a sign that they are being drawn into the political process and might give up the armed insurgency — "even if they were [drawn into the political process], it would not prevent them from pursuing a two-track policy of both political representation and guerrilla war."
3. The guerrillas are winning the war against US forces. — "this level of insurgency could never defeat the US military in the field.'
4. Iraqis are grateful for the US presence and want US forces there to help them build their country. — "Opinion polls show that between 66% and 80% of Iraqis want the US out of Iraq on a short timetable. Already in the last parliament, some 120 parliamentarians out of 275 supported a resolution demanding a timetable for US withdrawal, and that sentiment will be much stronger in the newly elected parliament."
5. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, born in Iran in 1930, is close to the Iranian regime in Tehran — "Sistani rejects Khomeinism, and would be in jail if he were living in Iran, as a result. He has been implicitly critical of Iran's poor human rights record, and has himself spoken eloquently in favor of democracy and pluralism."
6. There is a silent majority of middle class, secular-minded Iraqis who reject religious fundamentalism. — "A clear majority of Iraqis, and the vast majority of the Arab Iraqis, are constructing new, fluid political identities that depend heavily on religious and ethnic sub-nationalisms."
7. The new Iraqi constitution is a victory for Western, liberal values in the Middle East. — [the results are mixed at best, and perhaps unsustainable]
8. Iraq is already in a civil war, so it does not matter if the US simply withdraws precipitately, since the situation is as bad as it can get. — "No, it isn't. ... Iraq is Malibu Beach compared to Afghanistan in its darkest hours. The US has a responsibility to get out of Iraq responsibly and to not allow it to fall into that kind of genocidal civil conflict."
9. The US can buy off the Iraqis now supporting guerrilla action against US troops. — "US military and civilian officials in Iraq have on numerous occasions alleged in the press or privately to me that a vast infusion of billions of dollars from the US would dampen down the guerrilla insurgency. In fact, it seems clear that far more Sunni Arabs support the guerrilla movement today than supported it in September of 2004, and more supported it in September of 2004 than had in September of 2003."
10. The Bush administration wanted free elections in Iraq. — [I'm not sure I agree with this, except insofar as the Bush administration certainly didn't want immediate free, democratic elections on the US model. There are a lot of ways to skin the cat. It seems to me that the Bush administration was initially trying to set the table slowly, rather than all at once — admittedly, Matt McIntosh had to talk me into this view]
Meanwhile, here's my own quick overview of the internal political situation:
Shiites WANT:
to be proportionally (60%) represented in the Iraqi government, giving them ulimate control of Iraq.
to erect a government somewhere between Islamic (acceptable to the US) and moderately Islamist (probably not acceptable to the US).
protection from Iranian and Sunni destabilization.
Shiites DON'T WANT:
a continued insurgency that threatens stability.
an outright Islamist regime similar to Iran.
the breakup of Iraq.
Kurds WANT:
autonomy
oil rights to Kirkuk.
federalism and protection from a centralized government.
a limitation of tensions between Turkey and Kurdish Iraq — for now, anyway.
Kurds DON'T WANT:
a strong central government.
a quick US withdrawal before the Kurds can defend themselves against challenges to their autonomy.
Sunnis WANT:
disproportionate influence relative to their percentage (20%) of the Iraqi population.
guarantees against shiite retribution and oppression.
a strong central government in Baghdad, ensuring their access to oil money.
integration (especially of former Baathist Sunnis) into Iraqi institutions — including the Interior Ministry and the Iraqi Security forces.
Sunnis DON'T WANT:
a weak central government which allows Shiites and Kurds to withdraw from the oil-poor central region and leave the Sunnis to wither, poor and powerless.
Islamist Shiite dominance
to lose their only real leverage: the threat of insurgency.
Finally, bear in mind that the US and Iraq also have to navigate the treacherous waters of Israel and Iran, both of whom seem to be agitating for geopolitical leverage in their recent rhetoric. (remember, in a game of chicken, it pays to look crazy) The best leverage we have in the Iran/Israel problem is probably a continued US presence in a stable Iraq.
That's leverage, though, and not a solution. The problem we still have is how to turn our leverage — and all of the aforementioned competing interests — into a solution. That is still far from clear.
My returning military contacts tell me virtually all the violence in Iraq is now being perpetrated by outsiders......Jordanians, Syrians, Iranians. I’m not sure your take on the Sunnis is correct. There is little long-term advantage, political and otherwise, to blowing up/alienating their brothers. The obvious question is, can the majority control the outsiders?
Seemingly, you’re falling into the same trap that many liberals do: going strictly by the name, and not understanding that the name is a function of social convention and not necessarily indicative of direction to be traveled.
My returning military contacts tell me virtually all the violence in Iraq is now being perpetrated by outsiders......Jordanians, Syrians, Iranians.
It’s the suicide bombings that are generally being done by outsiders, who are more likely to be suicidal jihadists, rather than simply interested in ending the occupation and securing ethnic interests.
I’m not sure your take on the Sunnis is correct. There is little long-term advantage, political and otherwise, to blowing up/alienating their brothers.
Of course there is some advantage to be had. The trick for the Sunni political leadership is to use the threat of unstopped violence as leverage, but to not let it get out of control or grow to the point where the Shiites decide they have to war against the Sunnis to stop it. It’s a delicate game.
They apparently voted overwhelmingly (yet to be confimed) for Islamists and secular parties did badly, presumably they want an Islamist state.
You might be right, but there’s a broad range of Islam>Islamism. At this point, it’s hard to tell where they’re falling on that spectrum.
