Blame the Army Posted by: Dale Franks
on Wednesday, December 15, 2004
John Guardiano is an enlisted marine, and a veteran of the War in Iraq. In an article he writes for the Wall Street Journal today, he makes the same points I do about the problem with armored vehicles and force protection in Iraq.
The U.S. military ultimately wants 8,100 up-armored humvees versus the nearly 6,000 such vehicles that it has currently, Gen. Whitcomb told reporters last week. Moreover, according to the Army vice chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Richard A. Cody, the military long ago embarked on a "Manhattan-like project" to remotely jam IEDs with radio sensors.
If you're an American soldier or Marine whose life is on the line now, clearly that's not good enough. On the other hand, it simply isn't true that U.S. military leaders have callously ignored the troops' request for up-armored vehicles and other protective equipment. In fact, most of our troops in Iraq have up-armored vehicles, and units there take force protection quite seriously.
Delays ought to be blamed on the military bureaucracy, which Secretary Rumsfeld has been trying to reform. Indeed, that's what military transformation--a Rumsfeld priority--is all about. Yet, many of the same people who are most vociferously denouncing the lack of up-armored humvees in Iraq also fight military reform tooth and nail.
That doesn't mean Rumsfeld shouldn't be fired for other things. But it does, mean, I think, that the limitations of the Secretary's power make the blame for this problem rest more heavily on the army than on the SecDef's office. Yeah, I think Rumsfeld has made a lot of mistakes for which he can be criticized, and that he should pay with his job. But the armor deal just isn't one of them.
The SecDef is not a generalissimo or some sort of Roman tribune who has the plenary power to order something to be done. His ability to reform the army's bureaucracy and purchasing system is quite limited--and requires serious congressional input. The army can always refuse--politely, of course--by telling him that his orders violate the written regulations of the army on materiel purchases, as well as DOD regs on procurement and testing, making his request impossible until the written regulations are changed, which, of course will take time, what with the need to draft the new regs, get congressional approval, solicit comments from the field, etc., etc., etc. McQ is right. The problem does lie with leadership. It lies with the leadership of the Army.
Indeed, if my career in the USAF taught me anything, it was that "blame the Army" is a generally acceptable non-specific excuse for...well...everything.
But you're right ... its a leadership failure which uses the bureaucracy as an excuse. The only way that sort of incompetence is allowed to continue is to accept the excuse and the inevitability of bureaucratic ossification screwing up the system.
Sorry, but when lives are on the line, I just flat won't accept that anymore. Army leadership and "Pentagon" leadership need to get off their dead asses, make the right decisions and then make them happen, even if it means bureaucratic heads roll.
I'd much rather see figurative heads rolling than literal ones in Iraq due to this leadership failure.
Army leadership and "Pentagon" leadership need to get off their dead asses, make the right decisions and then make them happen, even if it means bureaucratic heads roll.
The only figurative "head rolling" that comes to mind is Shinseki being replaced by Schoomaker - and that wasn't the "head rolling" it was made out to be.
Indeed, if my career in the USAF taught me anything, it was that "blame the Army" is a generally acceptable non-specific excuse for...well...everything.
There's a reason we talk about conditions where the rubber meets the road, flyboy ...
