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Quds Force - a primer
Posted by: McQ on Sunday, August 19, 2007

Interesting article on the al Quds (Jeruselem) Force, a "small cadre of senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard leaders who can call on special Guard units if it needs boots on the ground activities". And, of course, we're seeing those "activities" from this force in Iraq. This is one of the reasons the US is considering naming the IRG a terrorist organization:
According to U.S. and European intelligence friends, the Quds Force is the group that made the decision to allow senior al Qaeda operatives into Iran, as well as Osama bin Laden’s son, Sa’ad. The group also allowed many family members of al Qaeda to exit Afghanistan through Iran in 2001, including at least one of bin Laden’s wives.

The al Quds Force does not always operate with the full knowledge and consent of the central government; nor do its leaders appear to be accountable to either the central command of the Revolutionary Guard or the civilian government. The Force seems to be the interlocutor between the Iranian military apparatus and al Qaeda, a relationship that has waxed and waned over time, and despite the strong hatred that often exists between Shi’ite and Sunni groups, they can, on occasion, work together.

[...]

It is also the Quds Force, which controls Iran’s military acquisitions and determines what military hardware goes to both the Shi’ite militias in Iraq as well as what goes to Hezbollah in Lebanon.

This role as the gatekeeper makes targeting the multiple front groups operated by the Force potentially important, depending on the level of intelligence that exists on its financial structure.
Reading that you can understand why the US is reluctant to claim that the Iranian government is complicit in the activities which are obviously being backed by players in Iran. By naming the IRG, and by proxy Quds Force, it avoids that obvious diplomatic problem and allows for the targeting of the elements within Iran which are, without a doubt, behind much of the violence in Iraq. I'd also suggest, when and if it becomes official that the IRG is so designated, that this is a step taken in lieu of a military strike.
 
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You’ve left out some critical facts:
1) Al-Quds Force was created by ROnald Reagan at Bush ’41’s behest; and
2) The current commander has Bush ’43’s ’cell ’phone on speed dial....

Proving that this is all a part a vast criminal conspiracy by the BFEE stretching back decades to Prescott Bush’s alliance with the Nazi’s or rather Hitler’s alliance with Prescott Bush and the Bush Family’s secret and evilllll plot to rule the world, all thru the fronts of the Trilateral Commission, the Bildabergers and the Joooos....

If you look at it sideways and squint just right, it all becomes clear...
 
Written By: Joe
URL: http://
Plausible deniability at work. Not to worry, though. I have it on good authority that Iranian moderates are susceptible to outside influence and pressure, and will surely keep them under control. That’s how the Brits got their folks back, dontcha know.
 
Written By: timactual
URL: http://
joe, you left out the part the Freemasons played in all this.
 
Written By: josh b
URL: http://
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/19/opinion/19jayamaha.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1



VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the “battle space” remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers’ expense.

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a “time-sensitive target acquisition mission” on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse — namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington’s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made — de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government — places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict — as we do now — will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.
At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. “Lucky” Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, “We need security, not free food.”

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are — an army of occupation — and force our withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.
 
Written By: David Shaughnessy
URL: http://
"Reading that you can understand why the US is reluctant to claim that the Iranian government is complicit in the activities which are obviously being backed by players in Iran. By naming the IRG, and by proxy Quds Force, it avoids that obvious diplomatic problem..."
Ducking Iran is how we got in this mess. For years the White House has looked the other way while Iran has directly or not-so-indirectly killed hundreds, maybe thousands of our troops in Iraq.

The president and his team have been preserving their relationship with the mullahs in order to be able to negotiate a way out of Iraq that doesn’t involve the political cost of fighting to win against our enemies. Gates was hand-picked from the Baker commission as part of making sure all the Administration’s key players are on the same songsheet and will work hard to see the deal.

Naturally, the LLMSM is in full support of this evasion.
 
Written By: Lastango
URL: http://

 
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