Realpolitik and the Bush Administration [PT 1] Posted by: Jon Henke
on Wednesday, January 26, 2005
It's not often that I disagree with Dale--I've seen what happens to those who do, and it's not pretty--but I have to take exception with this recent comment concerning the policy implications of Bush's Inaugural Address...
...as of today, realpolitik is officially dead as far as the United States is concerned.
Actually, I suspect, what Dale meant was something more like: "As of today, Bush is putting the world on notice that global democratization is very high on the list of our national security priorities." And, indeed, that is essentially what Dale wrote in a follow-on post.
The whole point of the Inaugural Address was to meld the idealistic vision of promoting democracy into a realistic framework of foreign relations.
But that gives me an opportunity to address recent blogospheric discussions--and misunderstandings--of Realpolitik. First, a couple handy definitions.
RealPolitik -- "Politics based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations" [WordNet]
RealPolitik -- "Foreign policy based on calculations of power and the national interest" [Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy]
Both definitions are useful, though I prefer Kissingers formulation due to its emphasis on the two components of RealPolitik -- Power and National Interest -- which dictate the range of available and optimal policy choices. In short, Realpolitik is the recognition that, while you might like to see a flowering democracy in Freedonia--and such a thing would enhance the national security of the US--one should weigh the opportunity costs of making such a thing happen before committing diplomatic capital to that end. For example, if a war to free Freedonia would cause Sylvania to come into an anti-US detente with Eurasia, what then? Our National Security interests might be compromised, despite the newfound freedom in Freedonia.
It's a balancing act, and a lot of that calculation depends on a) how you perceive our national interests, b) how you perceive the balance of powers, and c) what you estimate the long-term consequence of a given action will be on that balance of power. There is more than a little uncertainty in calculations like those. As Bradford Plumer recently wrote...
Everyone has certain foreign policy ideals, as well as certain senses of limits, and those differ from person to person, but so what. I don't believe, for instance, that Michael Ledeen wants us to focus on ushering revolution into Iran, while I want the U.S. to negotiate with Tehran over nukes, all because Ledeen's an "idealist" and I'm a "realist". Rather, it's because we have very different empirical takes on the situation -- on the viability of revolution, or on the sinister intentions of Iran's mullahs. In certain possible worlds we could reach factual convergence on these issues without altering our theories of foreign policy.
[In follow-up posts, I'm going to a) explore the Neoconservative roots of this policy formulation, and explain why the Inaugural address is neither new nor disturbingly militaristic, and b) point out some misunderstandings of Realpolitik as it relates to an ongoing diplomatic success.]
RESPONSE (Dale):
Before you go too far along this path, Jon, I'd just like to point out that I was referring to the popular conception of Realpolitik, which is that support any SOB as long as he is our SOB, not some dictionary definition of it. I think it's clear that the Bush Doctrine is very realistic, in terms of understanding how we may have to, in fact, support some SOBs here and there.
The problem with the old conception of realpolitik is that, in practice, democracy promotion just didn't happen. We were far more interesting in containing communism than promoting democracy. The Bush doctrine sets that on its ear, and implies that any necessary support for our SOBs is a temporary alliance of convenience.
That does, I think, kill realpolitik as it was generally understood to be practiced. It may have replaced it with a new kind of realpolitik, one more suited to the current age than that of the Cold War, but the Cold War version of Realpolitik does appear to me to be stiffening, turning an odd shade of green, and starting to smell.
RESPONDING BACK [Jon]:
I don't see that as a change in realpolitik at all. It's just a change in the balances of power which Realpolitik analyses. During the Cold War, our battle was with another Superpower, so Realpolitik demanded a more defensive posture of containment - bleed 'em dry in the middle-ground, as it were. Today, though, the paradigm is such that we can afford to be more proactive. Realpolitik isn't a set of defined policy prescriptions...it is merely the concept of balancing ideals with realities.
At any rate, that's pretty much exactly what you wrote in the follow-on post that I noted, so I'm pretty sure we're on the same page: Our National Interest has swung farther towards democracy promotion, rather than stability and containment.
Dale, you’re just wrong ... look at Asia and Europe today, and to a lesser extent Latin America. The U.S. often promoted democracy in those regions.
DALE RESPONDS: Oh, you mean like our support for Bautista in Cuba, Pinochet in Chile, Sukarno in Indonesia? Or our decades of support for Somoza, Peron, and Noriega (until he got too pushy and started messing with us)? Or the list of Military stronmen we propped up in South Vietnam? Or perhaps you are referring to the strenuous democracy promotion we pushed after Sov tanks rumbled into East Berlin in ’48, or Hungary in ’56, or Czechoslovakia in ’68. Maybe you’re talking about our support for democracy in the various Mideastern emirates like Qatar and Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Or the wonderful work we did in creating consensual government in Iran, under the Shah. Perhaps you’re referring to opening up relations with China so we could play one Commie regime off against another.
No, really, please detail for me the deep committment to democracy promotion we displayed during the Cold War. I’m keen to hear it.
The irony, Dale, is I think that in the places where we had the greatest commitments, we often made the greatest effort to try and promote democracy.
It was a balancing act, countering the tide of Red Communism (as the saying used to go) versus promoting liberty and democracy.
I'd point to the evolution of South Korea, Syngman Rhee (elected strongman), through Generals Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, to the eventually more liberal Roh Tae-woo, who set the stage for the eventual return of the likes of Kim Dae-jung.
Similarly, in the main, the Philippines were democratic, until Marcos overturned the standing constitution. But Magsaysay was democratically elected.
Thailand went through a gyrating set of leaders, some military, some elected. Singapore has had elections, and although heavily stacked, they're far more real than, say, the elections in the MidEast.
Similarly, it took time, but I think we had a good thing to with midwifing the eventual democratization of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras all come to mind). Again, it was hesitant and involved backsliding, but in the main, the more aid we provided, the more we also tried to train the troops to avoid the worst excesses and tried to foster a sense of civil-military separation.
Were we always on the side of democracy? Of course not. But in the main, I'd venture that we tried, often at the edges, and sometimes in the center. Arguably, more to the point, more so than any other state, including the Brits and French.
I’d argue that we *did* practice democracy promotion in most instances during the Cold War, but only on the margins.
That is, we didn’t directly push for democratic institutions, but we did stand in the gap against communism....which, ultimately, brought them closer to actual democracy than would have been the case, otherwise.
As with putting up the parking brake on a car facing uphill, you’re not actually making the car go forward...but you’re preventing the car from going backward. And that is, at least, marginally more "forward" than the alternative.
However, apply too much resistance to that handbrake, and the "car" will begin to stink. Also, I should work in some reference to the engine, "revolutions per minute" and Central America. But I fear I’ve taken the analogy much too far, already.
Certainly, by preventing nations from El Salvador to Japan from falling to Communism, we ultimately gave them a far better chance to both democratize and prosper than they would've had under Soviet tutelage.
But, I'd suggest that we tried to aid and abet democracy, both at the margins and, in a few cases, at the core. Short of toppling the government ourselves, it's not clear what choices might've presented themselves in a South Korea---but by constantly pushing for democracy, we helped midwife it there.
And (interestingly), we "imposed" democracy on Japan, where it had little record.
