The two dozen Iraqi soldiers marched in formation into downtown Mosul, streets emptying in their path. The men trained their rifles on potential bomb threats: a donkey-drawn vegetable cart, a blue Opel sedan, a man with a bulge beneath his tattered gray coat.
Less than a month ago, U.S. forces patrolled these dangerous streets. But on this humid morning there were only the Iraqis and a lone U.S. adviser, Marine Staff Sgt. Lafayette Waters, 32, of Kinston, N.C., who blended unobtrusively into the patrol.
That's right ... they're starting to turn over the patrolling of Mosul to the Iraqi military with, at this time, only a US advisor with the patrols. Sort of a reverse Vietnam which started with advisors to VN units and escalated to US combat units taking the primary role in the war.
As has been said many times, this is one of the most critical pieces to a free Iraq. Now granted this is in the northern area which is pretty tame by comparison, but you don't learn how to do this stuff effectively by sitting in a classroom. You do it by getting out there and attempting it.
The transition, at least in the north, may come within the year:
Col. Robert B. Brown, commander of the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), which conducts combat operations throughout northern Iraq, predicted the transition would come "over the next six months to a year . . . until pretty soon they've got the whole area and we do nothing but respond" to emergencies.
Note what COL Brown is saying. The US Army is the "go to hell" contingency. Only when the Iraqis don't think they can handle it will the US troops involve themselves. My guess is that call will actually come from the advisors.
That's not to say everyone agrees they Iraqis are ready:
The ambitious strategy is being questioned by some U.S. military advisers who work closely with the Iraqi forces. They say that although the Iraqis are progressing, they are being rushed into battle before they are ready in an effort to speed the withdrawal of American forces.
"It's all about perception, to convince the American public that everything is going as planned and we're right on schedule to be out of here," said one adviser, Army Staff Sgt. Craig E. Patrick, 40, a reservist from Rock Island, Ill. "I mean, they can [mislead] the American people, but they can't [mislead] us. These guys are not ready."
Waters, who has lived with the 23rd Iraqi Battalion's 1st Company since Jan. 15, said that the Iraqi soldiers "have a lot of heart and are making progress" but that "we need to slow it down and do it right. The worst thing that could happen is to have to come back in and fix the problem."
My guess is, with all due respect to the two sergeants, the truth lies somewhere in between. I would imagine right now that the Iraqis are a very mixed bag when it comes to experience and ability. But again its important to stress that sometimes you have to push a training program like this even when you're not satisfied its completely perfect or the troops are perfectly ready.
Not all the Iraqis included are that happy either, but not for the same reason:
The Iraqi forces are still poorly equipped, U.S. advisers and Iraqi soldiers agreed. Most ride into battle in "Road Warrior"-like white Nissan pickup trucks with machine guns welded into the bed and makeshift armor supported by plywood and even cardboard. Iraqi units lack medics, adequate communications equipment, computers and other battlefield necessities.
"This is the 21st century," said Lt. Col. Raad Abdul Hassan, an Iraqi company commander with the 23rd Battalion. "It's shameful what we have."
Those things have to be earned, Hassan, and what you don't want is what happened in VN when we armed the RFPFs and found all that equipment in Viet Cong hands the next time we had to fight them. They need to earn their spurs and then bitch about equipment.
Another part of this, of course, is driven by the fact that until recently, the public didn't particularly endorse Iraqis in the military. Consequently they weren't likely to get the cream of the crop in terms of enlistees. Now that seems to be changing.
But again, I can't stress enough how important it is to do something like this as soon as it seems safe to do it. Experience is critical and that can only be gained on the ground. Just as importantly it exposes problems in leadership and technique which can be observed and fixed. Read these to paragraphs for perfect examples:
U.S. officers said the experiment has been successful so far. Since its arrival in Mosul, the battalion has suffered one combat death; five others have been wounded. Marine Maj. Frank Shelton, the battalion's senior adviser, said the battalion arrested about 140 suspected insurgents in its first 70 days. Despite fears that insurgents would test the battalion, the area appears to have experienced no more insurgent activity than areas of the city controlled by American units.
Still, the 6th Brigade has already replaced two of three battalion commanders while in Mosul. In addition, a company commander was replaced shortly after he hid behind a wall when a small group of insurgents attacked a polling site on election day with grenades and small-arms fire.
Obviously the 2 battalion commanders and the one company commander couldn't cut the mustard, but that only became evident during actual operations. I would guess the same thing was observed about various junior leaders and NCOs with those who failed the operation test being replaced by some who didn't.
Critical, critical training and assessment. And its critical because we don't want what one US soldier thinks might happen to happen.
Marine Gunnery Sgt. Kenneth Kurre, an adviser to the 23rd Battalion, said that concerned him. He said he worried that the insurgents were "just biding their time, and when we're gone it'll go back to ass-whuppin' time."
We'll see won't we? If done right, they'll hold their own, but, if rushed like some fear, it will indeed again be "ass-whuppin' time", and Iraq's freedom will again be in jeopardy.