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Failing Insurgency 101
Posted by: McQ on Thursday, June 23, 2005

Max Boot takes us through the reasons the insurgency in Iraq is bound to fail:
The rebels lack a unifying organization, ideology and leader. There is no Iraqi Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro or Mao Tse-tung. The top militant is Abu Musab Zarqawi, a Jordanian who has alienated most of the Iraqi population, even many Sunnis, with his indiscriminate attacks on civilians.
No unifying leader. No "cult of personality". Zarqawi certainly can't pull it off with the way he's blown up everything that moves, and bin Laden isn't in the running because he has no real visibility anymore. And there certainly isn't a unifying Iraqi personality. Al-Sadr, for instance, has joined the process, not the opposition.
Support for the insurgency is confined to a minority within a minority — a small portion of Sunni Arabs, who make up less than 20% of the population. The only prominent non-Sunni rebel, Muqtada Sadr, has quietly joined the political process. The 80% of the population that is Shiite and Kurdish is implacably opposed to the rebellion, which is why most of the terror has been confined to four of 18 provinces.
We have a country which was a veritable ammo dump when we invaded. Saddam had been on an arms and explosives shopping spree for years. It is weapons from this spree we keep turning up when we find a cache. Even what seems to be in endless supply is finite. So while this small minority in a minority seems well supplied now, it will eventually begin to run short, and without inside or outside support, its effectiveness will begin to wane.
Unlike in successful guerrilla wars, the rebels in Iraq have not been able to control large chunks of "liberated" territory. The best they could do was to hold Fallouja for six months last year. Nor have they been able to stage successful large-scale attacks like the Viet Cong did. A major offensive against Abu Ghraib prison on April 2 ended without a single U.S. soldier killed or a single Iraqi prisoner freed, while an estimated 60 insurgents were slain.
As Gen Vines pointed out this is a movement of 4 different parts, all with different aims. There is no cohesiveness. As Marines have noted, they're even fighting among themselves. The lack of a safe haven limits their ability to plan, marshall and effectively attack. There is no Laos to hide in.
The biggest weakness of the insurgency is that it is morphing from a war of national liberation into a revolutionary struggle against an elected government. That's a crucial difference. Since 1776, wars of national liberation have usually succeeded because nationalism is such a strong force. Revolutions against despots, from Czar Nicholas II to the shah of Iran, often succeed too, because there is no way to redress grievances within the political process. Successful uprisings against elected governments are much rarer because leaders with political legitimacy can more easily rally the population and accommodate aggrieved elements.
As Boot notes, this is probably the biggest problem for the insurgency. It isn't fighting to destroy a tyranny, its fighting to establish one. It is fighting against the direct will of the people of Iraq as demonstrated by their vote. The ball, of course, is in the Iraqi government's court. Forming a broadly inclusive government which satisfies the vast majority of Iraqis will go a long way toward this insurgency's defeat. And indications are that's the way the process is going.

Boot goes on to outline the problems which Iraq still faces, problems I've outlined elsewhere as well. But the bottom line is, given time, and our continued presense and effort, there is no reason a democratic Iraq able to defend itself cannot emerge. It is our obligation, as a nation, to help them achieve that goal.
 
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What about the American presence in Iraq? the iraqi governemtns association with the US puts them into the "enemy’ category of many Iraqis.

let’s not forget about the insulot to the Iraqi ego that foriegn occupation has. US and Isreal are linked as one in the general preceptin of who the US is. How many prisoners do we now hold in the jails there? How many are innocent? No, there is more going on than a few ’dead enders’.
 
Written By: tom
URL: http://
A recent poll in Iraq suggested that 45% of Iraqis support the insurgency. I’d define that as the home grown ’remove the US from our country’ type of insurgents rather than the foreign suicide bombers or the tit for tat sectarian killings - as there is a distinct difference. When you take out of that equation the Kurdish block, you might be surprised to find that large parts of the Iraqi people (especially Sunni’s) do support the insurgents - this has to be the case otherwise the insurgency wouldn’t be able to exist without co-operation of the people - classic guerrilla warfae situation. The simple fact is most Iraqis want the US out of their country, and some are prepared to shoot and kill US soldiers to do so.

As one famous Vietnam commander said, "We didn’t have to win the war, we just had to make sure we didn’t lose it" - there’s a massive difference.
 
Written By: Andrew
URL: http://
this has to be the case otherwise the insurgency wouldn’t be able to exist without co-operation of the people

Oh bullshit.

All it takes is lack of active co-operation of the people with the government forces. Sometimes you don’t even need that. All you need is to have the people who know who the terrorists are to be too afraid to rat them out. That’s not my definition of "co-operation" or "support".

 
Written By: Mark
URL: http://
Smoking the same stuff as Cheney and Rumsfeld, I see.
As Gen Vines pointed out this is a movement of 4 different parts, all with different aims. There is no cohesiveness. As Marines have noted, they’re even fighting among themselves. The lack of a safe haven limits their ability to plan, marshall and effectively attack. There is no Laos to hide in.
Yes - there is. It’s called Syria. It’s adjacent to Iraq on the map.

The premise of this post seems to be that because the "insurgency" does not represent insurgencies of the past, it is bound to fail. Says who? Where is this written down? And why has the insurgency gained strength since we invaded? By the logic of this post, its strength should be declining, not rising.
As Boot notes, this is probably the biggest problem for the insurgency. It isn’t fighting to destroy a tyranny, its fighting to establish one. It is fighting against the direct will of the people of Iraq as demonstrated by their vote. The ball, of course, is in the Iraqi government’s court. Forming a broadly inclusive government which satisfies the vast majority of Iraqis will go a long way toward this insurgency’s defeat. And indications are that’s the way the process is going.
Ignorance is bliss. The insurgency is not there to establish a democracy or a tyranny. It is there to protect the interests of Sunnis who see no future in a "democratic" Iraq. The problem is that no government, no matter how broad, can give the Sunnis what they want. That is why the insurgency has heated up since April 28, not cooled down. And like the Communists in Vietnam, the Sunnis in Iraq have unlimited support from abroad. Where the heck do you think those suicide bombers have been coming from? And what’s your proof that we can eliminate the support from abroad?
But the bottom line is, given time, and our continued presense and effort, there is no reason a democratic Iraq able to defend itself cannot emerge. It is our obligation, as a nation, to help them achieve that goal.
There are plenty of reasons, as discussed above. But more to the point, why is it our obligation? Where is that written?

There are pessimists and optimists. The optimists said we would be down to 30,000 troops by Dec ’03. The pessimists said otherwise. The pessimists have been more right so far than the optimists.

The bottom line seems to be this: We cannot pull out until rid the country of the insurgency. But we can’t do that until we establish a security force that can take over when we leave. But we cannot establish an effective security force unless we root the insurgents out of the force. But we can’t do that until we rid the country of the insurgency.

It’s called a quagmire.
 
Written By: mkultra
URL: http://
VC did not have many safe havens in South Vietnam that America could not enter at will. The NVA massacre at Hue did not stop the NVA from winning. America lost the war.

Contras carried out massacre upon massacre, were viewed by most of the population as drug traffickers and murderers. Were fighting to reinstall a dictator. Elections were held and the party that said we will stop the Contras by making them part of the government won.

 
Written By: Unaha-closp
URL: http://
VC did not have many safe havens in South Vietnam that America could not enter at will.

You need to do a little reading about a country called Cambodia. That is where many had their haven.

Elections were held and the party that said we will stop the Contras by making them part of the government won.

Uh huh ... and that has what to do with the point of trying to overthrow a tyranny vs. trying to overthrow a duly elected government?
 
Written By: McQ
URL: http://qando.net
You need to do a little reading about a country called Cambodia. That is where many had their haven.

So sort of like Syria, you mean?

Uh huh ... and that has what to do with the point of trying to overthrow a tyranny vs. trying to overthrow a duly elected government?

It means that if they keep fighting the Islamofacists will be offered a place in the government. So they will keep fighting until a party of appeasement gains power in Iraq (and by association America).
 
Written By: Unaha-closp
URL: http://
So sort of like Syria, you mean?

Nope.

It means that if they keep fighting the Islamofacists will be offered a place in the government. So they will keep fighting until a party of appeasement gains power in Iraq (and by association America).

AQ and the Baathists? Not in this century.

The Sunnis have already been offered a place in the government.
 
Written By: McQ
URL: http://qando.net
Nope.

I think Syria is a safehaven for terrorists, terrorists do infiltrate Iraq from Syria.

AQ and the Baathists? Not in this century.

That is pretty much what the Conservatives said as little as 20 years ago, now the IRA is "powersharing".
 
Written By: Unaha-closp
URL: http://
I think Syria is a safehaven for terrorists, terrorists do infiltrate Iraq from Syria.

Only the foreign terrorists, not the Iraqi insurgents. And neither are basing out of there and striking into Iraq. They (the foreign element) are only infiltrating out of there.

That is pretty much what the Conservatives said as little as 20 years ago, now the IRA is "powersharing".

The IRA is neither a foreign force (AQ) nor a former part of a tyrannical regime (baathists).
 
Written By: McQ
URL: http://qando.net
Only the foreign terrorists, not the Iraqi insurgents. And neither are basing out of there and striking into Iraq. They (the foreign element) are only infiltrating out of there.

Your posted report of conflict "Red on Red" at or near the border, suggests nationalists are in the locale.


The IRA is neither a foreign force (AQ) nor a former part of a tyrannical regime (baathists).

Thus eliminating them from categories 1 & 3 of your summary of the General Vines interview. (Very helpful BTW)

2. Sunni religious extremists. Also not a large group.

4. Predominantly Sunni group who wants foreign forces to leave the country. A broader, larger group.

Substitute Catholic for Sunni and you can see that the situation is somewhat similar in Iraq as it was in N. Ireland.
 
Written By: Unaha-closp
URL: http://
Your posted report of conflict "Red on Red" at or near the border, suggests nationalists are in the locale.

Inside Iraq, yes. That’s precisely where they are. And apparently they’re getting tired of the foreign infiltrators as well.

The point is they’re not using and operating out of Syria in terms of having a safe haven free from intervention by our or Iraqi forces. In fact, in his Senate testimony today, Gen. Casey made a point of that fact, saying the lack of a safe haven is a problem for and hurts the insurgents.

Substitute Catholic for Sunni and you can see that the situation is somewhat similar in Iraq as it was in N. Ireland.

I already covered that by saying the Sunnis had ALREADY been offered a seat at the table.

Those I said wouldn’t be offered a seat and who aren’t at all like the IRA are AQ and the baathists.
 
Written By: McQ
URL: http://qando.net

 
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