The MSM’s reaction to Iraq Strategy Posted by: McQ
on Thursday, December 01, 2005
Some interesting comments among the newspapers of note in the US concerning the Bush strategy for Iraq. Note again, as Jon pointed out, this isn't new. However it is now, with the level of visibility given the issue in the last few weeks, not something that can be further ignored.
The real question about Mr. Bush's strategy, which few in Congress dare to ask, is whether the means meet the ends. Every plan the administration has prepared, starting with the original invasion, has been based on overly optimistic assumptions and insufficient resources. Now, once again, the strategy supposes a series of successes in the next 12 months that approach the miraculous: the appearance of tens of thousands of capable Iraqi troops; the brokering of a political accord among Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds; the formation of a workable democratic government; an acceleration of reconstruction; a significant decline of the insurgency; and a 40 percent reduction of U.S. forces. But what if Iraqi leaders refuse to compromise, and instead split the country into several pieces? What if Iraqi forces fail to control the insurgency in the areas where they have taken over?
Given that almost every report and editorial rendered by the MSM has been overly pessimistic (they vote is doomed, the constitution is doomed, an army can never be raised and trained, civil war was imminent, it's a quagmire, it's Vietnam) I can see how the WaPo might consider the administration plans to be "overly optimistic". Yet, all of the doom and gloom predicted by the WaPo and other outlets has yet to come to pass. But to answer the questions posed, if Iraqi leaders refuse to compromise, then the timeline is delayed. If Iraqis fail to control the insurgency, the timeline is delayed. Why? Because the goals outlined in the strategy will not have been fulfilled, and I think it was pretty obvious that withdrawal of our troops is contingent on fulfilling the goals of the strategy for Iraq.
When can the troops really come home? His answer Wednesday — when Iraqi forces can do the job themselves — is sensible, and his detailed description of progress in that effort lent some balance to the often gloomy reports from the front. But he simply ignored glaring problems, particularly in the nature of the Iraqi troops who are taking over. On the ground, for instance, there are troubling reports of sectarian militias joining the security forces as a cover for their own agendas, and that they favor Saddam-style torture. The specter arises of rival militias fighting a civil war — perhaps being trained and armed by the United States.
The president's comments about the Iraqi forces' progress seemed to lay the groundwork for a drawdown of U.S. forces, but he set no measurable benchmarks or goals.
What will success really look like? Bush said he would not accept "anything less than complete victory" in Iraq. A White House strategy document released Wednesday along with Bush's speech defines victory, in the longer term, as an Iraq that's "peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism."
Bush's job is to lay out the "grand strategy" if you will. It is the job of the generals to apply the proper tactics to get the job done. Unlike LBJ who picked targets for air strikes into North Vietnam, Bush properly leaves that task to those on the ground. That includes dealing with the militias and the allegations of torture. That doesn't mean the issue is being ignored, but it isn't something which should be included in a strategy speech.
As for the benchmarks for Iraqi forces progress, the benchmarks exist. We know the approximate size and endstate we want before we begin significant drawdowns. We've catagorized the level of training in which we want to see the 110 to 120 Iraqi battalions. Obviously we want a significant number of Level 1 (or Category 1) battalions, meaning they can conduct opertaions independently of US forces. And at a minimum we want the rest at least at the Level 2 (or Category 2) level (able to take the lead in operations which involve US forces) before we begin significant drawdowns. How that translates into a date isn't clear at this time, but the tasks have been identified, the metrics exist and it now is a matter of fulfilling task and standard to reach the desired end state.
The NY Times spends its time on a similar issue. After noting the same problem as USA Today (militias) it comments on the counterinsurgency battle:
Mr. Bush's vision of the next big step is equally troubling: training Iraqi forces well enough to free American forces for more of the bloody and ineffective search-and-destroy sweeps that accomplish little beyond alienating the populace.
What Americans wanted to hear was a genuine counterinsurgency plan, perhaps like one proposed by Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., a leading writer on military strategy: find the most secure areas with capable Iraqi forces. Embed American trainers with those forces and make the region safe enough to spend money on reconstruction, thus making friends and draining the insurgency. Then slowly expand those zones and withdraw American forces.
Here we again run full into ignorance of military affairs in general. Does the Times understand what it is asking when it says it wants to hear a "genuine counterinsurgency plan"?
A counterinsurgency plan is something which would cover years, since the life of an insurgency is 7-9 years on average. The Bush administration has consistently said that it isn't there to fight that battle, but to buy time to prepare Iraqi troops to fight that battle. While Krepinevich's "oil spot" plan may have some validity, it makes much more sense to have the Iraqis implement it than US forces. Thus it isn't our plan to write or present, is it?
Speaking of Krepinevich, we have the Wall Street Journal:
Or as military analyst Andrew Krepinevich put it to us yesterday, whether Iraq was a "war of choice" or a "war of necessity" at the beginning, it certainly is the latter now. Our adversaries the world over—from North Korea to Syria's Bashar Assad to Iran's mullahs—are watching to see if America has the will to win in Iraq.
But yesterday's speech was most notable because for the first time in months Mr. Bush dug into the details of the U.S. military strategy, especially the training of Iraqi forces. There are now more than 120 battle-ready Iraqi police and Army battalions "in the fight" and ready to assume more responsibility as long as there is a stable Iraqi government to lead them, he said.
And he justifiably pointed to the early fall offensive that cleaned up Tal Afar and allowed its residents to vote in the October Constitutional referendum. Iraqi forces led that fight, and they have stayed as part of a "clear, hold and build" strategy that is sure to be repeated in other parts of the Sunni Triangle. While no Iraqi battalions "owned" their own battlespace in mid-2004, some 33 do now. This includes the units patrolling Haifa Street and other once troublesome neighborhoods in Baghdad.
That first paragraph is a strategically critical point. This is no longer any other war but a war of necessity, whether you agree or disagree about its actual necessity in the beginning. There is much at stake in Iraq, and it is critical to the future of the US and the rest of the world that the US succeed there. As more and more Iraqi units take over their areas of operations and succeed, the more we can concentrate our effort on the supporting structures of the military and get them up to speed as well. But having 33 battalions policing their own areas is a significant step forward.
None of this is to deny that Iraqi forces continue to have sectarian and loyalty problems. But there is every reason to believe that the Iraqi government to be elected later this month can work those out over time. In fact, getting Iraqi battalions to complete operational independence certainly won't happen until there are stronger ministries of defense and interior to facilitate their supply chain. The current bottom line, however, is that about 45 Iraqi battalions of about 750 men each are able to lead combat operations on their own.
Note the difference in how the problem is presented here as opposed to the USA Today and the NY Times.
Secondly, we've heard this mantra on the left about the necessity of Bush admitting mistakes and making changes. Well, here you go:
Mr. Bush was also candid in admitting that the U.S. changed strategy on Iraqi security force training in 2004 after several missteps. "Progress by the Iraqi security forces has come, in part, because we learned from our earlier experiences and made changes in the way we help train Iraqi troops," he said.
This puts him ahead of a press corps that still focuses on past failures. In the latest issue of The Atlantic Monthly, for example, James Fallows purports to explain "Why Iraq Has No Army." But the public affairs office of the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq (or "Min-sticky") says Mr. Fallows not only didn't visit but didn't even contact them while reporting the article or at anytime during at least the past nine months.
Min-sticky commander General Martin Dempsey told us from Baghdad yesterday that not a single Iraqi Army or police unit has folded in battle this year the way some did during the spring 2004 violence. He added that about 4,000 former Iraqi officers have responded to a recent recruitment drive, a sign that they see their future residing with a democratic Iraq and not their old Baathist masters.
So Bush admits a change in strategy for training Iraqi troops after several "missteps" and the US military is now, according to reports, forging a viable Iraqi defense force with some selected inclusion of officers from the former Iraqi army. That will certainly speed up both the training and transition process. The unsung heroes in all of this, and the people who get little or no recognition or praise are those unnamed and unknown Iraqi soldiers who, as GEN Dempsey points out, have never folded once in battle this year. That's significant.
The comments, frankly, are pretty predictable given the source. But also noteable is the fact that none of them are terribly critical of Bush in relative terms. Much of the criticism has to do with not understanding what they're criticizing or mixing tactics and strategy and criticizing Bush for not getting in the tactical weeds in a strategy speech. Or, said another way, par for the course.
Bush's strategy should be to continue to give the country updates such as he did in his speech at the Naval Academy. And let his critics, like John Kerry, continue to come across as petulant children who's only solution is to dwell in the past, lament their vote and cry for the immediate withdrawal of the troops regardless of the status of the mission.
UPDATE: James Fallows contacts us in the comments section and and provides us with a copy of a letter to the editor of the WSJ written by his managing editor at The Atlantic Monthly. In the letter, he names the contacts Mr. Fallows had with the public affairs office of the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq during his preparation of the story cited.
And let his critics, like John Kerry, continue to come across as petulant children who’s only solution is to dwell in the past, lament their vote and cry for the immediate withdrawal of the troops regardless of the status of the mission.
"Now, once again, the strategy supposes a series of successes in the next 12 months that approach the miraculous: the appearance of tens of thousands of capable Iraqi troops..."
"The current bottom line, however, is that about 45 Iraqi battalions of about 750 men each are able to lead combat operations on their own."
Just what sort of definition of "miraculous" is WaPo using?
This is not your fault, but FYI the report you quote from the Wall Street Journal was itself factually incorrect. This is a letter that the Atlantic’s editor, Cullen Murphy, just sent to the Wall Street Journal:
To the Editor:
Your editorial about President Bush’s speech latest speech on Iraq ("Complete Victory," Dec. 1) contains a false statement about an article on the effort to train Iraqi forces by our correspondent James Fallows ("Why Iraq Has No Army," Atlantic Monthly, December 2005). You said that according to the training organization, the Multinational Security Transition Command in Iraq, Fallows "didn’t even contact them while reporting the article or at anytime during at least the past nine months."
That is untrue. Mr. Fallows had extensive email correspondence, starting last August, with the Public Affairs Officer for that organization, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Wellman, who arranged an interview with its commander, Lieutenant General Dave Petraeus, in September. Mr. Fallows spoke with General Petraeus by phone for more than an hour, and checked quotes from that interview via Lt. Col. Wellman before using them in his article.
He also interviewed one of Petraeus’s deputies, Colonel John Martin, and had not-for-attribution discussions, via phone and email, with other members of the organization. As Mr. Fallows pointed out in his article, and as he has records to demonstrate, the Pentagon’s press office turned down his requests to interview Major General Paul Eaton and others who had been involved in the training effort.
At no point before printing this false statement did you contact Mr. Fallows or me to determine whether what you intended to publish was true.
McQ - quoting incorrect information to show that Bush’s critics are wrong? Well, that’s never happened before.
But then, he shares much in common with the object of his worship, Mr. Bush.
Here is what Bush said in his speech:
The progress of the Iraqi forces is especially clear when the recent anti-terrorist operations in Tal Afar are compared with last year’s assault in Fallujah. In Fallujah, the assault was led by nine coalition battalions made up primarily of United States Marines and Army — with six Iraqi battalions supporting them…This year in Tal Afar, it was a very different story. The assault was primarily led by Iraqi security forces — 11 Iraqi battalions, backed by five coalition battalions providing support.
Here is what the WSJ - in an article McQ relies on, had to say about Tal Afar:
And he justifiably pointed to the early fall offensive that cleaned up Tal Afar and allowed its residents to vote in the October Constitutional referendum. Iraqi forces led that fight, and they have stayed as part of a "clear, hold and build" strategy that is sure to be repeated in other parts of the Sunni Triangle.
Here is what Michael Ware of Newsweek has to say on the same subject:
I was in that battle from the very beginning to the very end. I was with Iraqi units right there on the front line as they were battling with al Qaeda. They were not leading. They were being led by the U.S. green beret special forces with them.
Here is what Senator John Warner had to say about Ware’s account:
“I respect those journalists that embed themselves and I accept as a credible description what you’ve just put forward.”
The problem with McQ’s "reasoning" - as always, is that he bases it on false information. Because the information is false, the argument cannot be correct. But this is part of a larger problem - one that Fallows was wrestling with. Over the past couple of years the administration has thrown out all sorts of wild numbers about Iraqi troop readiness. Time and again, those claims have turned out to be false.
And then you get administration shills like McQ making arguments based on those false numbers - and calling those who dare to challenge the administration’s false claims "petulant children." See, if one does not accept the lies Bush makes, or the WSJ makes, one is a petutlant child. This is what passes for discourse from the right. And a majority of Americans has finally figured it out - the "credbility" gap.
Sorry McQ - nice try though. When you start basing your arguments on reliable sources, you might be taken seriously. But when you simply repeat the lies from the politicos on the right and their whores in the media, what’s the point in listening?
No, really, "we will, in fact be greeted as liberators", and "We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.”
No, really, "we will, in fact be greeted as liberators", and "We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.”
Now lets balance that out with "We’re there to steal their oil" and "We’re there for Halliburton" and "hundreds of thousands will die in our siege of baghdad" and "the arab street will violently rise up against us and create wave after wave of terror attacks against us" and my favorite "Iraqis are not ready or fit to govern themselves"
VIENNA, Austria - Two of America’s allies in Iraq are withdrawing forces this month and a half-dozen others are debating possible pullouts or reductions, increasing pressure on Washington as calls mount to bring home U.S. troops. Bulgaria and Ukraine will begin withdrawing their combined 1,250 troops by mid-December. If Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland and South Korea reduce or recall their personnel, more than half of the non-American forces in Iraq could be gone by next summer.
—Uhhhh, let’s see, we will also be having a big drawdown of US troops in mid-December since the elections will be over. And the plan is to reduce our forces by nect Summer as well.
But it sure works well for the MSM to make it sound like we are being abandoned.
VIENNA, Austria - Two of America’s allies in Iraq are withdrawing forces this month and a half-dozen others are debating possible pullouts or reductions, increasing pressure on Washington as calls mount to bring home U.S. troops. Bulgaria and Ukraine will begin withdrawing their combined 1,250 troops by mid-December. If Australia, Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland and South Korea reduce or recall their personnel, more than half of the non-American forces in Iraq could be gone by next summer.
—Uhhhh, let’s see, we will also be having a big drawdown of US troops in mid-December since the elections will be over. And the plan is to reduce our forces by nect Summer as well.
But it sure works well for the MSM to make it sound like we are being abandoned.
I was in that battle from the very beginning to the very end. I was with Iraqi units right there on the front line as they were battling with al Qaeda. They were not leading. They were being led by the U.S. green beret special forces with them.
So now the entire 120 battalions are suspect because one embed, who probably didn’t really understand what he was seeing, thinks the one unit he was with is indicative of every unit in Iraq?
Wow. And you wonder why you’re not taken seriously MK? Look up the term "anecdotal".
So now the entire 120 battalions are suspect because one embed, who probably didn’t really understand what he was seeing, thinks the one unit he was with is indicative of every unit in Iraq?
Wow. And you wonder why you’re not taken seriously MK? Look up the term "anecdotal".
Ha ha - nice try again to change the subject. There were eleven Iraqi, er, Kurdish and Shiite army batallions and 3 paramilitary police batallions in the Tal Afar offensive, not 120. Moreover, you weren’t there, Ware was. But because Ware does not lick Bush’s boots, you think he doesn’t know what he is talking about.
Bush lied - again.
If being taken seriously means uncritically accepting every word that comes out of Dear Leader’s mouth as fact, then no. I am not being taken seriously.
Well gee MK, what has the fact that Fallows claims to have talked with someone who claims he didn’t have to do with the gist of the story?
The gist of the story is that the Iraqi "army" has reached a certain readiness level. Fallows shows that it hasn’t. The WSJ said Fallows was uniformed. That assertion turned out to be a lie. That’s what it has to do with the "gist" of the story.
Do I have to draw you a map?
Your the one who quoted the incorrect information, not me. But then, as I noted above, you kind of have a habit of doing that.
Ha ha - nice try again to change the subject. There were eleven Iraqi, er, Kurdish and Shiite army batallions and 3 paramilitary police batallions in the Tal Afar offensive, not 120. Moreover, you weren’t there, Ware was. But because Ware does not lick Bush’s boots, you think he doesn’t know what he is talking about.
Hey, I’m not trying to draw the inference from one embed’s report, MK, you are.
So tell me ... what level was the unit this embed was with?
The gist of the story is that the Iraqi "army" has reached a certain readiness level. Fallows shows that it hasn’t.
Fallows "shows" no such thing.
Do I have to draw you a map?
Apparently you need to draw yourself one.
Your the one who quoted the incorrect information, not me. But then, as I noted above, you kind of have a habit of doing that.
Well there is one difference between you and me. I do it mistakenly. You, otoh, do it on purpose.
There were eleven Iraqi, er, Kurdish and Shiite army batallions and 3 paramilitary police batallions in the Tal Afar offensive, not 120. Moreover, you weren’t there, Ware was. But because Ware does not lick Bush’s boots, you think he doesn’t know what he is talking about.
1. Who (other than you, MK) asserts that all 120 Iraqi batallions were used in the Tel Afar offensive? After all, if these are all combat arms battalions that would be roughly 13 divisions worth of combat arms battalions. And they wouldn’t be guarding other areas in Iraq.
2. Since Ware is a journalist, there is a fairly good chance that he doesn’t know squat about the military. Or at least those portions that appear to be meaningless detail but are actually kind of important. Like calling a Sergeant Major, "Major", which is wrong on so many levels.
3. It is not a given, MK, that all the Iraqi units used in the Tal Afar offensive were Category 1.
Every soldier, sailor, Marine or airman who dies, is wounded for life or otherwise scarred by this useless exercise in political fascism, certainly evokes pity but for those vicious swine who plotted this war and who have kept it going without any plan to end it, should be taken out and shot in public...in batches of ten and without the benefit of clergy.
How many fucking times have we killed al-Qaida’s No. 3?
Officials: CIA missile strike kills al-Qaida No. 3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10303175/ While Pakistani officials publicly said Rabia died in a blast caused by explosives stored in a house for bomb-making, officials speaking on condition of anonymity told NBC News he was killed by a CIA missile strike carried out by an unmanned Predator airplane.
’U.S. assassinated al-Qaeda commander’ http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3178610,00.html CIA launched missile, killing another four people
CIA Denies Using Torture http://www.thinkandask.com/2005/120305cia.html The European Union is proposing to suspend voting rights from any country it finds to have supported the alleged United States’ torture camps. McClellan added that there is no greater proof that "by liberating people in Afghanistan and Iraq —some 50 million people— no one has done more when it comes to human rights than the United States of America," and he said the people of the United States agree with him?
Condoleezza Rice, US secretary of state, is expected to begin her trip to Europe next week with a forceful rejection of requests for information regarding alleged secret CIA prisons in Europe and clandestine transiting of war-on-terror suspects. http://news.ft.com/cms/s/a8c983de-6382-11da-be11-0000779e2340.html While refusing to respond to reports of secret prisons and transport of detainees in Europe, officials insist that US actions are in compliance with US law and international conventions. US law prohibits secret prisons on US territory. Elizabeth Cheney, a senior state department official and daughter of the vice president, told Arab reporters this week that “a new set of rules” was required when dealing with an enemy like al-Qaeda. European concerns have been exacerbated by the Bush administration’s efforts to exempt the CIA from proposed US legislation that would prohibit the “cruel, inhumane and degrading” treatment of detainees.
14 GIs Die After Worst Attack Since Aug.
Bush: Marines Sacrificed ’For an Important Cause’
Senator, General Defend Iraq Propaganda Plan
Pentagon: Not Sure if Paying for Stories Is Legal
If another 10 Marines had not been killed Thursday outside Fallujah, this would have been the week to note that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s preening gamecock persona finally has realized its comedic potential. http://www.calendarlive.com/columnists/rutten/cl-et-rutten3dec03,0,3137922.column?coll=cl-home-more-channels Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch — the U.S. military’s top spokesman in Baghdad — defended the program because the Al Qaeda murder gang’s local thug-in-chief, Abu Musab Zarqawi, "is lying to the Iraqi people" through the media. According to Lynch, the United States doesn’t lie. "We don’t need to lie. We do empower our operational commanders with the ability to inform the Iraqi public, but everything we do is based on fact."
It began with the willful misrepresentation of intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s weapons programs and then proceeded through the cover-up and justification of torture and abuse of prisoners, to the deliberate suppression of information concerning Iraqi civilian casualties that now appear to number in the tens of thousands.
Propaganda intended to counter enemy propaganda, U.S. military says http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/politics/13314691.htm The articles were designed to counter "misinformation and propaganda by an enemy intent on discrediting the Iraqi government and the Coalition, and who are taking every opportunity to instill fear and intimidate the Iraqi people," the statement said.
U.S. propaganda effort described http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20051203/NEWS07/512030326/1009 Military officials in Baghdad for the first time described a Pentagon program that pays to plant stories in the Iraqi news media, a method the top U.S. military commander said Friday was part of an effort to "get the truth out."
How many fucking times have we killed al-Qaida’s No. 3?
Oh I dunno, have they done away with the number 3 position in their organization or have we been successful in killing a number of sucessors to the number 3 position?
The rest of your diatribe is about as silly as your first question.
